EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation

Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez ()

American Economic Review, 2013, vol. 103, issue 1, 80-106

Abstract: In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes. (JEL C78, D82, H75, I21, I28)

JEL-codes: C78 D82 H75 I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.80
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (181) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.1.80 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/feb2013/20110139_app.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:1:p:80-106

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

 
Page updated 2022-08-13
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:1:p:80-106