Inferring Strategic Voting

Kei Kawai () and Yasutora Watanabe

American Economic Review, 2013, vol. 103, issue 2, 624-62

Abstract: We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies. (JEL D72)

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.624
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (72)

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Working Paper: Inferring Strategic Voting (2009)
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