Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach

Stephan Lauermann

American Economic Review, 2013, vol. 103, issue 2, 663-89

Abstract: Dynamic matching and bargaining games are models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific matching and bargaining games. (JEL C73, C78, D82, D83)

JEL-codes: C73 C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.663
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach (2011)
Working Paper: Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach (2007)
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