Social Preferences under Risk: Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcome

Kota Saito

American Economic Review, 2013, vol. 103, issue 7, 3084-3101

Abstract: This paper axiomatizes a utility function for social preferences under risk. In the model, a single parameter captures a preference for equality of opportunity (i.e., equality of exante expected payoffs) relative to equality of outcome (i.e., equality of ex-post payoffs). In a deterministic environment, the model reduces to the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The model is consistent with recent experiments on probabilistic dictator games.

JEL-codes: C72 D71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.7.3084
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (112)

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