Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions
James Albrecht (),
Pieter Gautier () and
Susan Vroman ()
American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 10, 3288-96
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.10.3288
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Working Paper: Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:10:p:3288-96
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