Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process

Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 12, 3885-3920

Abstract: Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members of Congress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians? We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illustrate how both are at work. In support of the connections view, we show that lobbyists follow politicians they were initially connected to when those politicians switch to new committee assignments. In support of the expertise view, we show that there is a group of experts that even politicians of opposite political affiliation listen to. However, we find a more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise. (JEL D72, D82)

JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3885
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (149)

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Working Paper: Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process (2011)
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