The Economics of Predation: What Drives Pricing When There Is Learning-by-Doing?
David Besanko,
Ulrich Doraszelski and
Yaroslav Kryukov
American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 3, 868-97
Abstract:
We formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry-dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure. As an illustrative example we focus on learning-by-doing. To disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we decompose the equilibrium pricing condition. We show that forcing firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation-like behavior. Along with the predation-like behavior, however, a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated.
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D83 K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.3.868
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.3.868 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/app/10403/20111548_app.pdf (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/10403/20111548_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/10403/20111548_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:3:p:868-97
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().