Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

Michael Kearns, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth and Jonathan Ullman

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 5, 431-35

Abstract: We study the design of mechanisms satisfying a novel desideratum: privacy. This requires the mechanism not reveal "much" about any agent's type to other agents. We propose the notion of joint differential privacy: a variant of differential privacy used in the privacy literature. We show by construction that mechanisms satisfying our desiderata exist when there are a large number of players, and any player's action affects any other's payoff by at most a small amount. Our results imply that in large economies, privacy concerns of agents can be accommodated at no additional "cost" to standard incentive concerns.

JEL-codes: C70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.431
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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