The VCG Auction in Theory and Practice

Hal R. Varian and Christopher Harris

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 5, 442-45

Abstract: We describe two auction forms for search engine advertising and present two simple theoretical results concerning i) the estimation of click-through rates and ii) how to adjust the auctions for broad match search. We also describe some of the practical issues involved in implementing a VCG auction.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.442
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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