Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

Yuval Heller

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 6, 1857-63

Abstract: Demichelis & Weibull (AER 2008) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.6.1857
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.6.1857 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/10406/20131149_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:6:p:1857-63

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().