Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 8, 2400-2420

Abstract: We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps surprisingly) that in equilibrium later disclosures are interpreted more favorably even though the time the manager obtains the signals is independent of the value of the firm. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies.

JEL-codes: D21 D82 G32 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2400
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Working Paper: Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure (2012)
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