Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation
Dina Mayzlin,
Yaniv Dover and
Judith Chevalier
American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 8, 2421-55
Abstract:
Firms' incentives to manufacture biased user reviews impede review usefulness. We examine the differences in reviews for a given hotel between two sites: Expedia.com (only a customer can post a review) and TripAdvisor.com (anyone can post). We argue that the net gains from promotional reviewing are highest for independent hotels with single-unit owners and lowest for branded chain hotels with multi-unit owners. We demonstrate that the hotel neighbors of hotels with a high incentive to fake have more negative reviews on TripAdvisor relative to Expedia; hotels with a high incentive to fake have more positive reviews on TripAdvisor relative to Expedia.
JEL-codes: L15 L83 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2421
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (259)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.8.2421 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/app/10408/20121079_app.pdf (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/10408/20121079_data.zip (application/zip)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/10408/20121079_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation (2012) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:8:p:2421-55
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().