Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Mu?ls, Laure de Preux and Ulrich Wagner

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 8, 2482-2508

Abstract: When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon intensive and trade exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation.

JEL-codes: H23 Q52 Q53 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.8.2482
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (180)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Industry compensation under relocation risk: a firm-level analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme (2014)
Working Paper: Industry Compensation Under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (2013)
Working Paper: Industry Compensation Under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (2012)
Working Paper: Industry compensation under relocation risk: a firm-level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (2012)
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