Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism

Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino and Mariano Sigman

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 11, 3416-42

Abstract: We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83)

JEL-codes: C72 D63 D64 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141409
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (125)

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