Price Reaction to Information with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Wealth Effects: Underreaction, Momentum, and Reversal

Marco Ottaviani and Peter Sørensen

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 1, 1-34

Abstract: This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information provided that traders become less risk averse as their wealth increases. In a dynamic setting, underreaction results in initial momentum and then reversal in the long run. (JEL D83, D84, G11, G12, G14)

JEL-codes: D83 D84 G11 G12 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20120881
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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