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Immigration Enforcement and Crime

Paolo Pinotti

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 5, 205-09

Abstract: Immigration enforcement has ambiguous implications for the crime rate of undocumented immigrants. On the one hand, expulsions reduce the pool of immigrants at risk of committing crimes, on the other they lower the opportunity cost of crime for those who are not expelled. We estimate the effect of expulsions on the crime rate of undocumented immigrants in Italy exploiting variation in enforcement toward immigrants of different nationality, due to the existence of bilateral agreements for the control of illegal migration. We find that stricter enforcement of migration policy reduces the crime rate of undocumented immigrants.

JEL-codes: J15 J18 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151040
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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