More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay Be Coercive and Repugnant?

Sandro Ambuehl, Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sandro Ambühl

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 5, 357-60

Abstract: IRBs can disallow high incentives they deem coercive. A vignette study on MTurk concerning participation in medical trials shows that a substantial minority of subjects concurs. They think high incentives cause more regret, and that more people would be better off without the opportunity to participate. We model observers as judging the ethicality of incentives by partially using their own utility. The model predicts that payments are repugnant only to the extent that they affect the participation decision, and more so for larger transactions. Incentivizing poorer participants is more repugnant, and in-kind incentives are less repugnant than monetary incentives.

JEL-codes: D12 D64 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151034
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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