Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment

Charles Noussair, Daan van Soest and Jan Stoop ()

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 5, 408-13

Abstract: We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.

JEL-codes: C71 C93 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.p20151018 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ds/10505/P2015_1018_ds.zip (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/10505/P2015_1018_data.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:5:p:408-13

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().