An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

Nikhil Agarwal

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 7, 1939-78

Abstract: This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)

JEL-codes: C78 I11 J31 J44 K21 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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Working Paper: An Empirical Model of the Medical Match (2014)
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