No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax

Dina Pomeranz

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 8, 2539-69

Abstract: Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third-party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean firms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence effect. This leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the VAT chain. These findings confirm that when taking evasion into account, significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation. (JEL D83, H25, H26, K34, O17)

JEL-codes: D83 H25 H26 K34 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130393
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (383)

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Working Paper: No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax (2013)
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