How to Control Controlled School Choice

Federico Echenique and M. Bumin Yenmez

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 8, 2679-94

Abstract: We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed. (JEL D47, H75, I21, I28)

JEL-codes: D47 H75 I21 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130929
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (120)

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