Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Yves Breitmoser ()

American Economic Review, 2015, vol. 105, issue 9, 2882-2910

Abstract: In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however, Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS‐showed that experimental subjects predictably cooperate when the discount factor exceeds a particular threshold. I analyze individual strategies in four recent experiments to examine whether strategies are predictable, too. Behavior is well summarized by "Semi-Grim" strategies: cooperate after mutual cooperation, defect after mutual defection, randomize otherwise. This holds both in aggregate and individually, and it explains the BOS-threshold: Semi-Grim equilibria appear as the discount factor crosses this threshold, and then, subjects start cooperating in round 1 and switch to Semi-Grim in continuation play. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D12)

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 D12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130675
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Working Paper: Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2012)
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