Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values
Daniel Garrett ()
American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, issue 11, 3275-99
We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate with time. We argue that consumers' randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice.
JEL-codes: D42 D82 L12 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130564
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 2HJ3QCWJh_ti6ObVNYfW (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:11:p:3275-99
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().