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Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Comment

Michal Krawczyk and Fabrice Le Lec

American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, issue 3, 836-39

Abstract: Based on experimental dictator games with probabilistic prospects, Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013) conclude that neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can fully account for observed behavior. We argue that their conclusion that ex ante comparisons cannot explain the data is at best weakly supported by their results, and do so on three grounds: (i ) the absence of significant differences between the most relevant treatments, (ii ) the implicit assumption of subjects' risk neutrality, and (iii ) the asymmetry of treatments regarding the disclosure of dictators' choice. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

JEL-codes: C72 D63 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130779
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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