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Experiments on Decisions under Uncertainty: A Theoretical Framework

Eran Shmaya and Leeat Yariv

American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, issue 7, 1775-1801

Abstract: The analysis of lab data entails a joint test of the underlying theory and of subjects' conjectures regarding the experimental design itself, how subjects frame the experiment. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing such conjectures. We use experiments of decision making under uncertainty as a case study. Absent restrictions on subjects' framing of the experiment, we show that any behavior is consistent with standard updating ("anything goes"), including those suggestive of anomalies such as overconfidence, excess belief stickiness, etc. When the experimental protocol restricts subjects' conjectures (plausibly, by generating information during the experiment), standard updating has nontrivial testable implications.

JEL-codes: C91 D11 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20120978
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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