Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

Gustavo Bobonis, Luis R. Cámara Fuertes and Rainer Schwabe

American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, issue 8, 2371-2405

Abstract: Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments.

JEL-codes: D72 H83 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130874
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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