Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Jonathan Levin and Andrzej Skrzypacz

American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106, issue 9, 2528-51

Abstract: The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.

JEL-codes: D44 D47 H82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141212
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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