Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support
Matias Iaryczower and
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 10, 2990-3005
We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. We show that competition reduces agents' welfare with public goods, or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents, and increases agents' welfare with public bads. We apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers, vote buying, and exclusive deals.
JEL-codes: D42 D62 D72 D82 G34 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150755
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 8YCe9sCzGggHUa8SG6zf (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... JW9Y0UKAL87QcDbbNdxA (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:10:p:2990-3005
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().