Beeps

Jeffrey C. Ely

American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 1, 31-53

Abstract: I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150218
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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