Shopping While Female: Who Pays Higher Prices and Why?
Anne Fitzpatrick
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 5, 146-49
Abstract:
I estimate gender price discrimination in the Ugandan antimalarial drug market with an audit study. To determine whether results are consistent with statistical or taste-based discrimination, I contrast gender results with results by ethnicity (tribe). Vendors initially offer women prices that are $0.12 (3 percent) higher. However, women are 16 percentage points more likely to successfully bargain for a discount, resulting in no differential in price paid. Results are stronger among majority-tribe females. I find no differences in drug quality. Both women and minorities report better service quality. Offer price differentials suggest statistical discrimination; there is no differential for prices paid.
JEL-codes: D12 J15 J16 L11 L65 L81 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171127
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171127 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... Ruj4LzVcemgySXn9zcq6 (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... t26o9bOkPyln8FT-Nhwg (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... EmQbTSI62OiHPbFydQdH (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:146-49
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().