Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match
Assaf Romm and
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 5, 205-09
We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
JEL-codes: C78 D40 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171048
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... yi7aarUz-l7gB0FWnQky (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master?s Match
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:205-09
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().