Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments
John William Hatfield,
Scott Kominers and
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 5, 214-19
We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.
JEL-codes: C78 D21 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171050
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