Why Being Wrong Can Be Right: Magical Warfare Technologies and the Persistence of False Beliefs
Nathan Nunn and
Raul Sanchez de la Sierra
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 5, 582-87
Abstract:
Across human societies, one sees many examples of deeply rooted and widely held beliefs that are almost certainly untrue. Examples include beliefs about witchcraft, magic, ordeals, and superstitions. Why are such incorrect beliefs so prevalent and how do they persist? We consider this question through an examination of superstitions and magic associated with conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Focusing on superstitions related to bullet-proofing, we provide theory and case-study evidence showing how these incorrect beliefs persist. Although harmful at the individual-level, we show that they generate Pareto efficient outcomes that have group-level benefits.
JEL-codes: D74 D83 O17 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171091
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171091 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 71Nz_p5AKLXzTkJtzFCg (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Why Being Wrong can be Right: Magical Warfare Technologies and the Persistence of False Beliefs (2017) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:582-87
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().