Economics at your fingertips  

Estimating Dynamic Games of Electoral Competition to Evaluate Term Limits in US Gubernatorial Elections

Holger Sieg and Chamna Yoon

American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 7, 1824-57

Abstract: This paper shows how to identify and estimate, using standard semi-parametric techniques, a class of dynamic games with perfect monitoring, that have been at the frontier of recent research in political economy. The empirical analysis provides novel quantitative insights into the trade-off that voters face between ideology and ability, the differences in ability and ideology among parties and states, and the differences in preferences between political candidates and voters. We analyze the consequences of term limits and quantify their relative importance. Specifically, we characterize conditions under which term limits improve voters' welfare.

JEL-codes: C57 C73 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150566
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf) ... bBl6aHbPIwrl9Rw7lwI1 (application/zip) ... Gu9D53UzIZY8xSWzr6hK (application/pdf) ... 5EPSdlT9y6AE9YHcWtL0 (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Jane Voros ().

Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:7:p:1824-57