Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions
Mariann Ollár and
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 8, 2243-77
Multiplicity of equilibria and the dependence on strong common knowledge assumptions are well-known problems in mechanism design. We address them by studying full implementation via transfer schemes, under general restrictions on agents' beliefs. We show that incentive-compatible transfers ensure uniqueness—and hence full implementation—if they induce sufficiently weak strategic externalities. We then design transfers for full implementation by using information on beliefs in order to weaken the strategic externalities of the baseline canonical transfers. Our results rely on minimal restrictions on agents' beliefs, specifically on moments of the distribution of types, that arise naturally in applications.
JEL-codes: D62 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151462
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... ZqBu9GsTs0ky8NGGDfL_ (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:8:p:2243-77
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().