Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties
Tymofiy Mylovanov and
American Economic Review, 2017, vol. 107, issue 9, 2666-94
Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.
JEL-codes: D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140494
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... UOfHWrg65-OS-UCRLon4 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 2c2Y_dpMH2uiAMFVldWq (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Working Paper: OPTIMAL ALLOCATION WITH EX-POST VERIFICATION AND LIMITED PENALTIES (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:9:p:2666-94
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().