An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply
Lawrence M. Ausubel
American Economic Review, 2018, vol. 108, issue 2, 561-63
In a comment, Okamoto (2018) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding.
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171408
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