Marking to Market versus Taking to Market
Guillaume Plantin and
Jean Tirole
American Economic Review, 2018, vol. 108, issue 8, 2246-76
Abstract:
Building on the idea that accounting matters for corporate governance, this paper studies the equilibrium interaction between the measurement rules that firms find privately optimal, firms' governance, and the liquidity in the secondary market for their assets. This equilibrium approach reveals an excessive use of market-value accounting: corporate performance measures rely excessively on the information generated by other firms' asset sales and insufficiently on the realization of a firm's own capital gains. This dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals, thereby making it more costly for firms to overcome their agency problems.
JEL-codes: D21 D82 G34 G38 M41 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161749
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20161749 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... 1UTSea7fnuN7See_cRjJ (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrie ... RExtFjXDrGGYf0Md7kw2 (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Marking to market versus taking to market (2018) 
Working Paper: Marking to market versus taking to market (2018) 
Working Paper: Marking to Market versus Taking to Market (2016) 
Working Paper: Marking to Market versus Taking to Market (2016) 
Working Paper: Marking to market versus taking to market (2015) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:8:p:2246-76
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo
More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().