Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception

Judd B. Kessler, Corinne Low and Colin Sullivan

American Economic Review, 2019, vol. 109, issue 11, 3713-44

Abstract: We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called incentivized resume rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood that candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

JEL-codes: D83 I26 J23 J24 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181714
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Working Paper: Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception (2019)
Working Paper: Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception (2019)
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