Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Pedro Dal Bó and Guillaume R. Fréchette

American Economic Review, 2019, vol. 109, issue 11, 3929-52

Abstract: We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies represent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit-for-Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round-by-round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181480
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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