Targeting with In-Kind Transfers: Evidence from Medicaid Home Care

Ethan Lieber and Lee Lockwood

American Economic Review, 2019, vol. 109, issue 4, 1461-85

Abstract: Making a transfer in kind reduces its value to recipients but can improve targeting. We develop an approach to quantifying this trade-off and apply it to home care. Using randomized experiments by Medicaid, we find that in-kind provision significantly reduces the value of the transfer to recipients while targeting a small fraction of the eligible population that is sicker and has fewer informal caregivers than the average eligible. Under a wide range of assumptions within a standard model, the targeting benefit exceeds the distortion cost. This highlights an important cost of recent reforms toward more flexible benefits.

JEL-codes: D82 H51 H75 I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180325
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Targeting with In-kind Transfers: Evidence from Medicaid Home Care (2018)
Working Paper: Targeting with In-kind Transfers: Evidence from Medicaid Home Care (2017)
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