Incentives and the Supply of Effective Charter Schools

John Singleton

American Economic Review, 2019, vol. 109, issue 7, 2568-2612

Abstract: Charter school funding is typically set by formulas that provide the same amount for students regardless of advantage or need. I present evidence that this policy skews the distribution of students served by charters toward low-cost populations by influencing where charter schools open and whether they survive. To do this, I develop and estimate an equilibrium model of charter school supply and competition to evaluate the effects of funding policies that aim to correct these incentives. The results indicate that a cost-adjusted funding formula would increase the share of disadvantaged students in charter schools with little reduction in aggregate effectiveness.

JEL-codes: H75 I21 I22 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171484
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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