Detecting Potential Overbilling in Medicare Reimbursement via Hours Worked: Comment

Brett Matsumoto ()

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 12, 3991-4003

Abstract: Fang and Gong (2017) develop a procedure to detect potential overbilling of Medicare by physicians. In their empirical analysis, they use aggregated claims data that can overstate the number of services performed due to features of Medicare billing. In this comment, I show how auditors can use detailed claims-level data to better target improper overbilling.

JEL-codes: H51 I13 I18 J22 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180812

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