Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors

Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer and Eyal Winter ()

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 3, 889-921

Abstract: A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm's optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm's payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality.

JEL-codes: D21 D86 G24 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors (2018)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190234

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