Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence

Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman and Francesco Trebbi

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 7, 2065-2102

Abstract: We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.

JEL-codes: D22 D64 D72 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence (2018)
Working Paper: Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence (2018)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180615

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