Acquiring Information through Peers

Bernard Herskovic and João Ramos

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 7, 2128-52

Abstract: We develop an endogenous network formation model, in which agents form connections to acquire information. Our model features complementarity in actions as agents care not only about accuracy of their decision-making but also about the actions of other agents. In equilibrium, the information structure is a hierarchical network, and, under weakly convex cost of forming links, the equilibrium network is core-periphery. Although agents are ex ante identical, there is ex post heterogeneity in payoffs and actions.

JEL-codes: D83 D85 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181798 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181798.appx (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181798.ds (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Acquiring information through peers (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:7:p:2128-52

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181798

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().