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Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets

Qingmin Liu

American Economic Review, 2020, vol. 110, issue 8, 2625-66

Abstract: We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A central idea is to formulate off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations and on-path beliefs in the absence of such deviations. A matching-belief configuration is stable if the matching is individually rational with respect to the system of on-path beliefs and is not blocked with respect to the system of off-path beliefs. The formulation provides a language for assessing matching outcomes with respect to their supporting beliefs and opens the door to further belief-based refinements. The main refinement analyzed in the paper requires the Bayesian consistency of on-path and off-path beliefs with prior beliefs. We define concepts of Bayesian efficiency, the rational expectations competitive equilibrium, and the core. Their contrast with pairwise stability manifests the role of information asymmetry in matching formation.

JEL-codes: C78 D40 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181186

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