Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing

Bruno Biais, Johan Hombert and Pierre-Olivier Weill

American Economic Review, 2021, vol. 111, issue 11, 3575-3610

Abstract: Incentive problems make securities' payoffs imperfectly pledgeable, limiting agents' ability to issue liabilities. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of such endogenous incompleteness in a dynamic exchange economy. Because markets are endogenously incomplete, agents have different intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, so that they value assets differently. Consequently, agents hold different portfolios. This leads to endogenous markets segmentation, which we characterize with optimal transport methods. Moreover, there is a basis going always in the same direction: the price of a security is lower than that of replicating portfolios of long positions. Finally, equilibrium expected returns are concave in factor loadings.

JEL-codes: D51 D52 G11 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing (2019)
Working Paper: Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing (2017)
Working Paper: Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing (2017)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181707

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