Vulnerability and Clientelism

Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul J. Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Simeon Nichter

American Economic Review, 2022, vol. 112, issue 11, 3627-59

Abstract: This study argues that economic vulnerability causes citizens to participate in clientelism, a phenomenon with various pernicious consequences. To examine how reduced vulnerability affects citizens' participation in clientelism, we employ two exogenous shocks to vulnerability. First, we designed a randomized control trial to reduce household vulnerability: our development intervention constructed residential water cisterns in drought-prone areas of Brazil. Second, we exploit rainfall shocks. We find that reducing vulnerability significantly decreases requests for private goods from politicians, especially among citizens likely to be in clientelist relationships. Moreover, reducing vulnerability decreases votes for incumbent mayors, who typically have more resources for clientelism.

JEL-codes: D72 H41 I38 O12 O17 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Vulnerability and Clientelism (2017)
Working Paper: Vulnerability and Clientelism (2017)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190565

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