Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services

Mitra Akhtari, Diana Moreira and Laura Trucco

American Economic Review, 2022, vol. 112, issue 2, 442-93

Abstract: We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05–0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor's party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 H75 H76 J45 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services (2016)
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DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171867

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